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Copyright and Federal Supremacy 
Prof. James Gibson, University of Richmond School of Law 
May 29, 2012 
The extent of federal power over our lives has been much in the news recently, what with the 
Supreme Court holding days of hearings on whether the Affordable Care Act is an 
unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.  Like the ACA, 
copyright regulation is federal, but it derives its constitutional authority from a different part of 
the Constitution, known as the Patent and Copyright Clause, which gives Congress the power 
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 
Congress’s power to enact copyright legislation is therefore uncontroversial.  Where controversy 
sometimes arises, however, is on the question of whether that power is unique to Congress, or 
whether the states share it.  (In this way, the question of federal copyright power is similar to the 
question in another high-profile Supreme Court case this term, Arizona v. United States, in which 
Arizona claims that federal immigration regulation does not preclude state regulation.) 
On the issue of shared power, the Patent and Copyright Clause has nothing to say.  Only the 
Constitution’s generally applicable Supremacy Clause speaks to the issue, and it says (among 
other things) that congressional laws take precedence over state laws.  What this means, simply 
stated, is that states are free to enact copyright laws of their own unless Congress has said 
otherwise. 
That seems simple enough.  And indeed, in some cases it is clear that a state regulation conflicts 
directly with federal regulation, and is thus preempted under a Supremacy Clause 
analysis.  Consider the exclusive right of public performance: Federal copyright law gives 
authors control over the public performance of their works.  So a songwriter can sue a band that 
plays her song in public without a license.  Now suppose a state passed a law giving bands the 
right to play songs in public without getting a license.  Such a state law would directly conflict 
with the federal law, and thus the state law would have to give way. 
In other cases, however, it is difficult to tell whether a true conflict exists.  Consider again the 
public performance right that federal copyright confers on authors.  But this time, suppose a state 
decides to regulate privateperformances.  For example, suppose Virginia passes a law forbidding 
anyone from singing a song in the shower without a license.  Does federal copyright law preempt 
such a regulation?  There is certainly no direct conflict, because the federal right addresses 
only public performances.  But the failure of Congress to address private performance can be 
interpreted in two ways. 
First, Congress’s failure to regulate private performances could mean that Congress simply 
doesn’t care about private performances.  That is to say, it does not view such conduct as 
sufficiently important to merit national regulation.  Under this interpretation, states can regulate 
private performances if they want; it’s no skin off Congress’s nose. 
But there’s a second plausible interpretation: Sometimes Congress’s failure to regulate certain 
conduct is the result of a carefully considered legislative decision that the conduct should remain 
unregulated.  Copyright law is full of such judgments, because it represents a balancing act 
between the rights of authors to exploit their works and the right of the public to have access to 
those works.  In other words, some conduct is left unregulated – that is, falls outside the 
copyright owner’s control – because allowing people to engage in that conduct is considered an 
important part of the balancing act that is federal copyright law. 
So maybe Congress meant to allow citizens to sing copyrighted songs in the privacy of their own 
showers.  Perhaps that is part of the trade-off that the public gets in exchange for giving authors 
the right to control publicperformances.  If that’s the case, a state attempt to regulate singing in 
the shower really does conflict with federal law, and should be preempted. 
Now, no state has actually forbidden singing in the shower.1   But many states have laws so 
broad that their coverage can overlap with copyright, presenting preemption issues.  Last month 
a federal district court confronted just such a state law in WNET v. Aero Inc.  Defendant Aero 
Inc. captures broadcast television and retransmits it over the Internet.  Unsurprisingly, the owners 
of the copyrights in the retransmitted programs sued Aero for infringement of copyright’s federal 
public performance right.  But they also sued for violation of New York’s unfair competition 
law, based on Aero’s “commercially exploiting [the television] programming and broadcasting 
infrastructure without authorization.” 
Aero moved to dismiss the unfair competition count, arguing that Congress tacitly intended the 
federal public performance right to define and delimit liability for unauthorized performances – 
regardless of whether that liability was based on state or federal law.  Last week the court 
granted the motion, noting that “Congress’s careful definition of what constitutes a public 
performance, and its decision not to create exclusive property rights to privately perform 
copyrighted works further suggests that preemption should bar Plaintiffs’ unfair competition 
claim.”  Either it’s federal copyright infringement, or it’s legal; there’s no in-between for New 
York. 
Copyright law – it keeps a lower profile than health care regulation and immigration, but when it 
comes to federal power, it holds its own. 
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